# CEDA Round 2 v Liberty CS

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#### WE WILL NOTE FIVE REASONS ON HOW THEY REINSCRIBE WHITE MALE PRIVILEGE

#### 1st – DRONE TALK - Drone prioritization is distancing – it analytically re-centers privilege and trades off with focusing on structural violence – the 1AC performatively erases the violence done to intersectionally marginalized populations

This Week In Blackness 13 ("Drone Policy Is the Most Important Racism," http://thisweekinblackness.com/2013/07/25/drone-policy-is-the-most-important-racism/)

There are several incidents of privilege-blindness among the mostly white male drone-obsessed elite. First, their public anger over the drone program seemed to begin when Eric Holder made [statements](http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/05/politics/obama-drones-cia) extending the legal justification for the program to killing U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.  That implies that these critics think that the U.S. government killing U.S. citizens is new or unusual, when a simple surface-level review of this country’s history shows that the government has always committed sustained and fatal violence against brown people, women, gay people, transpeople, disabled people, and poor people among others. People who insist on talking about drones as an ultimate evil ignore this history of violence, which is well-known in communities not their own. And, the likelihood that white men personally will be targeted by a drone is absurdly small, compared to the likelihood that a member of a marginalized community will continue to suffer from the government’s active and passive violence. So, hearing these critics air their feelings of being “targets” for the first time is offensive to those from communities that have lived under the gun for generations, especially because these feelings exclude points of view from those communities. If you are privileged enough to suddenly feel scared of the government, you are complicit in denying the violence against marginalized people that has always existed.The other part of white male critics’ anxiety comes from recognition that the world order is changing. Traditionally, the American president has been a white man who identifies and legitimizes white men’s problems as American Problems. Now, President Obama is the public face of America, and when he identifies a traditionally invisible Black People’s Problem, it becomes, for the first time, an American Problem. By stubbornly forcing Obama’s statements about Trayvon Martin into the framework of opposition to drone strikes, white male public intellectuals are attempting to return to white men the power to define American Problems. White critics insist that Obama addresses drone strikes above all other expressions of white supremacy, while claiming that they are the “true” soldiers against racism. They apparently believe that they get to decide which policies are “important-racist” and which ones are “unimportant-racist.” It must be a coincidence that the “unimportant-racist” policies are the ones that most directly validate white upper-class male privilege. Also, by arguing that drones exhibit “important racism,” these critics reinforce the narrative that killing Black people is “unimportant racism,” and not as valuable as executing white men’s philosophical priorities.

#### 2nd - Failure to foreground our own complicity - We must forefront our complicity in systems of dominations as the starting-point for building alliances – systems of oppression are inter-locking and reinforcing – our intersectional strategy is key to create more productive ways of interacting with one another outside heteropatriarchal white supremacy that produces an arbitrary system of permanent war and domination

Smith 9 (Andrea - intellectual, feminist, and anti-violence activist, Founder of INCITE - A National Activist Organization of radical feminists of color, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing," http://www.iamsocialjustice.com/images/Color\_of\_Violence.pdf)

This framework has proven to be limited for women of color and people of color organizing. First, it tends to presume that our communities have been impacted by white supremacy in the same way. Consequently, we often assume that all of our communities will share similar strategies for liberation. In fact, however, our strategies often run into conflict. For example, one strategy that many people in US-born communities of color adopt, in order to advance economically out of impoverished communities, is to join the military. We then become complicit in oppressing and colonizing communities from other countries. Meanwhile, people from other countries often adopt the strategy of moving to the United States to advance economically, without considering their complicity in settling on the lands of indigenous peoples that are being colonized by the United States. Consequently, it may be more helpful to adopt an alternative framework for women of color and people of color organizing. I call one such framework the "Three Pillars of White Supremacy." This framework does not assume that racism and white supremacy is enacted in a singular fashion; rather, white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct, but still interrelated, logics. Envision three pillars, one labeled Slavery/Capitalism, another labeled Genocide/Capitalism, and the last one labeled Orientalism/War, as well as arrows connecting each of the together. Slavery/Capitalism One pillar of white supremacy is the logic of slavery. As Sora Han, Jared Sexton, and Angela P. Harris note, this logic renders Black people as inherently slave- able-as nothing more than property.' That is, in this logic of white supremacy, Blackness becomes equated with slaveability. The forms of slavery may change- whether it is through the formal system of slavery, sharecropping, or through the current prison-industrial complex-but the logic itself has remained consistent. This logic is the anchor of capitalism, that is, the capitalist system ultimately commodifies all workers-one's own person becomes a commodity that one must sell in the labor market while the profits of one's work are taken by someone else. To keep this capitalist system in place-which ultimately commodifies most people-the logic of slavery applies a racial hierarchy to this system. This racial hierarchy tells people that as long as you are not Black, you have the opportunity to escape the commodification of capitalism. This helps people who are not Black to ' accept their lot in life, because they can feel that at least they are not at the very bottom of the racial hierarchy-at least they are nor property; at least they are not slaveable. The logic of slavery can be seen clearly in the current prison industrial complex (PIC). While the PIC generally incarcerates communities of color, it seems to be structured primarily on an anti-Black racism. That is, prior to the Civil War, most people in prison where white. However, after the thirteenth amendment was passed-which banned slavery, except for those in prison-Black people previously enslaved through the slavery system were reenslaved through the prison system. Black people who had been the property of slave owners became state property, through the conflict leasing system. Thus, we can actually look at the criminalization of Blackness as a logical extension of Blackness as property. Genocide/Colonialism A second pillar of white supremacy is the logic of genocide. This logic holds that indigenous peoples must disappear. In fact, they must always be disappearing, in order to allow non-indigenous peoples rightful claim over this land. Through this logic of genocide, non-Native peoples then become the rightful inheritors of all that was indigenous-land, resources, indigenous spirituality, or culture. As Kate Shanley notes, Native peoples are a permanent "present absence" in the US colonial imagination, an "absence" that reinforces, at every turn, the conviction that Native peoples are indeed vanishing and that the conquest of Native lands is justified. Ella Shoat and Robert Stam describe this absence as "an ambivalently repressive mechanism [which] dispels the anxiety in the face of the Indian, whose very presence is a reminder of the initially precarious grounding of the American nation-state itself.. .. In a temporal paradox, living Indians were induced to 'play dead,' as it were, in order to perform a narrative of manifest destiny in which their role, ultimately, was to dissappear." Rayna Green further elaborates that the current Indian "wannabe" phenomenon is based on a logic of genocide: non-Native peoples imagine themselves as the rightful inheritors of all that previously belonged to "vanished" Indians, thus entitling them to ownership of this land. "The living performance of 'playing Indian' by non-Indian peoples depends upon the physical and psychological removal, even the death, of real Indians. In that sense, the performance, purportedly often done out of a stated and implicit love for Indians, is really the obverse of another well- known cultural phenomenon, 'Indian hating,' as most often expressed in another, deadly performance genre called 'genocide."'~ After all, why would non-Native peoples need to play Indian- which often includes acts of spiritual appropriation and land theft-if they thought Indians were still alive and perfectly capable of being Indian themselves? The pillar of genocide serves as the anchor for colonialism-it is what allows non-Native peoples to feel they can rightfully own indigenous peoples' land. It is okay to take land from indigenous peoples, because indigenous peoples have disappeared. Orientalism/War A third pillar of white supremacy is the logic of Orientalism. Orient; s defined by Edward Said as the process of the West defining itself as a superior civilization by constructing itself in opposition to an "exotic" but inferior "Orient." (Here I am using the term "Orientalism" more broadly than to solely signify what has been historically named as the Orient or Asia.) The logic of Orientalism marks certain peoples or nations as inferior and as posing a constant threat to the well-being of empire. These peoples are still seen as "civilizations"-they are not property or "disappeared"-however, they will always be imaged as permanent foreign threats to empire. This logic is evident in the anti-immigration movements within the United States that target immigrants of color. It does not matter holy long immigrants of color reside in the United States, they generally become targeted as foreign threats, particularly during war time. Consequently, orientalism serves as the anchor for war, because it allows the United States to justify being in a constant state of war to protect itself from its enemies. For example, the United States feels entitled to use Orientalist logic to justify racial profiling of Arab Americans so that it can be strong enough to fight the "war on terror." Orientalism also allows the United States to defend the logics of slavery and genocide, as these practices enable the United States to stay "strong enough" to fight these constant wars. What becomes clear then is what Sora Han states- the United States is not at war; the United States is war.4 For the system of white supremacy to stay in place, the United States must always be at war. Because we are situated within different logics of white supremacy, we may misunderstand a racial dynamic if we simplistically try to explain one logic of white supremacy with another logic. For instance, think about the first scenario that opens this essay: if we simply dismiss Latinos or Arab peoples as "white," we fail to understand how a racial logic of Orientalism is in operation. That is, Latinos and Arabs are often situated in a racial hierarchy that privileges them over Black people. However, while Orientalist logic may bestow them some racial privilege, they are still cast as inferior yet threatening "civilizations" in the United States. Their privilege is not a signal that they will be assimilated, but that they will be marked as perpetual foreign threats to the US world order. Organizing Implications Under the old but still potent and dominant model, people of color organizing was based on the notion of organizing around shared victimhood. In this model, how- ever, we see that we are victims of white supremacy, but complicit in it as well. Our survival strategies and resistance to white supremacy are set by the system of white supremacy itself. What keeps us trapped within our particular pillars of white supremacy is that we are seduced with the prospect of being able to participate in the other pillars. For example, all non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands. All non-Black peoples are promised that if they comply, they will not be at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. And Black, Native, Latino, and Asian peoples are promised that they will economically and politically advance if they join US wars to spread "democracy." Thus, people of color organizing must be premised on making strategic alliances with each other, based on where we are situated within the larger political economy. Thus, for example, Native peoples who are organizing against the colonial and genocidal practices committed by the US government will be more effective in their struggle if they also organize against US militarism, particularly the military recruitment of indigenous peoples to support US imperial wars. If we try to end US colonial practices at home, but support US empire by joining the military, we are strengthening the state's ability to carry out genocidal policies against people of color here and all over the world. This way, our alliances would not be solely based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of others. These approaches might help us to develop resistance strategies that do not inadvertently keep the system in place for all of us, and keep all of us accountable. In all of these cases, **we would check our aspirations** against the aspirations of other communities to ensure that our model of liberation does not become the model of oppression for others. These practices require us to be more vigilant in how we may have internalized some of these logics in our own organizing practice. For instance, much racial justice organizing within the United States has rested on a civil rights framework that fights for equality under the law. An assumption behind this organizing is that the United States is a democracy with some flaws, but is otherwise admirable. Despite the fact that it rendered slaves three-fifths of a person, the US Constitution is presented as the model document from which to build a flourishing democracy. However, as Luana Ross notes, it has never been against US law to commit genocide against indigenous peoples-in fact, genocide is the law of the country. [The United States could not exist without it. In the United States, democracy is actually the alibi for genocide-it is the practice that covers up United States colonial control over indigenous lands. Our organizing can also reflect anti-Black racism. Recently, with the out- growth of "multiculturalism" there have been calls to "go beyond the black/white binary" and include other communities of color in our analysis, as presented in the third scenario. There are a number of flaws with this analysis. First, it replaces an analysis of white supremacy with a politics of multicultural representation; if we just include more people, then our practice will be less racist. Not true. This model does not address the nuanced structure of white supremacy, such as through these distinct logics of slavery, genocide, and Orientalism. Second, it obscures the centrality of the slavery logic in the system of white supremacy, which is based on a black/white binary. The black/white binary is not the only binary which characterizes white supremacy, but it is still a central one that we cannot "go beyond" in our racial justice organizing efforts. If we do not look at how the logic of slaveability inflects our society and our thinking, it will be evident in our work as well. For example, other communities of color often appropriate the cultural work and organizing strategies of African American civil rights or Black Power movements without corresponding assumptions that we should also be in solidarity with Black communities. We assume that this work is the common "property of all oppressed groups, and we can appropriate it without being accountable. Angela P. Harris and Juan Perea debate the usefulness of the black/white binary in the book, Critical Race Theory. Perea complains that the black/white binary fails to include the experiences of other people of color. However, he fails to identify alternative racializing logics to the black/white paradigm. Meanwhile, Angela P. Harris argues that "the story of 'race' itself is that of the construction of Blackness and whiteness. In this story, Indians, Asian Americans, and Latinos do exist. But their roles are subsidiary to the fundamental binary national drama. As a political claim, Black exceptionalism exposes the deep mistrust and tensions among American ethnic groups racialized as nonwhite."~ Let's examine these statements in conversation with each other. Simply saying we need to move beyond the black/white binary (or perhaps, the "black/non- black" binary) in US racism obfuscates the racializing logic of slavery, and prevents us from seeing that this binary constitutes Blackness as the bottom of a color hierarchy. However, this is not the only binary that fundamentally constitutes white supremacy. There is also an indigenous/settler binary, where Native genocide is central to the logic of white supremacy and other non-indigenous people of color also form "a subsidiary" role. We also face another Orientalist logic that fundamentally constitutes Asians, Arabs, and Latinos as foreign threats, requiring the United States to be at permanent war with these peoples. In this construction, Black and Narive peoples play subsidiary roles. Clearly the black/white binary is central to racial and political thought and practice in the United States, and any understanding of white supremacy must take it into consideration. However, if we look at only this binary, we may misread the dynamics of white supremacy in different contexts. For example, critical race theorist Cheryl Harris's analysis of whiteness as property reveals this weakness. In Critical Race Theory, Harris contends that whites have a property interest in the preservation of whiteness, and seek to deprive those who are "tainted" by Black or Indian blood from these same white property interests. Harris simply assumes that the positions of African Americans and American Indians are the same, failing to consider US policies of forced assimilation and forced whiteness on American Indians. These policies have become so entrenched that when Native peoples make political claims, they have been accused of being white. When Andrew Jackson removed the Cherokee along the Trail of Tears, he argued that those who did not want removal were really white.7 In contemporary times, when I was a non-violent witness for the Chippewa spearfishers in the late 1980s, one of the more frequent slurs whites hurled when the Chippewa attempted to exercise their treaty-protected right to fish was that they had white parents, or they were really white. Status differences between Blacks and Natives are informed by the different economic positions African Americans and American Indians have in US society. & African Americans have been traditionally valued for their labor, hence it is in the interest of the dominant society to have as many people marked "Black," as possible, thereby maintaining a cheap labor pool; by contrast, American Indians have been valued for the land base they occupy, so it is in the interest of dominant society to have as few people marked "Indian" as possible, facilitating access to Native lands. "Whiteness" operates differently under a logic of genocide than it does from logic of slavery. Another failure of US-based people of color in organizing is that we often fall back on a "US-centricism," believing that what is happening "over there" is less important than what is happening here. We fail to see how the United States maintains the system of oppression here precisely by tying our allegiances to the interests of US empire "over there." Heteropatriarchy and White Supremacy Heteropatriarchy is the building block of US empire. In fact, it is the building block of the nation-state form of governance. Christian Right authors make these links in their analysis of imperialism and empire. For example, Christian Right activist and founder of Prison Fellowship Charles Colson makes the connection between homosexuality and the nation-state in his analysis of the war on terror, explaining that one of the causes of terrorism is same-sex marriage: Marriage is the traditional building block of human society, intended both to unite couples and bring children into the world . . . There is a natural moral order for the family . . . the family, led by a married mother and father, is the best available structure for both child- rearing and cultural health. Marriage is not a private institution designed solely for the individual gratification of its participants. If we fail to enact a Federal Marriage Amendment, we can expect not just more family breakdown, but also more criminals behind bars and more chaos in our streets." Colson is linking the well-being of US empire to the well-being of the heteropatriarchal family. He continues: When radical Islamists see American women abusing Muslim men, as they did in the Abu Ghraib prison, and when they see news coverage of same-sex couples being "married" in US towns, we make this kind of freedom abhorrent-the kind they see as a blot on Allah's creation. We must preserve traditional marriage in order to protect the United States from those who would use our depravity to destroy us? As Ann Burlein argues in Lift High the Cross, it may be a mistake to argue that the goal of Christian Right politics is to create a theocracy in the United States. Rather, Christian Right politics work through the private family (which is coded as white, patriarchal, and middle class) to create a "Christian America." She notes that the investment in the private family makes it difficult for people to invest in more public forms of social connection. In addition, investment in the suburban private family serves to mask the public disinvestment in urban areas that makes the suburban lifestyle possible. The social decay in urban areas that results from this disinvestment is then construed as the result of deviance from the Christian family ideal rather than as the result of political and economic forces. As former head of the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, states: "'The only true solution to crime is to restore the family,"10 and "Family break-up causes poverty."" Concludes Burlein, "'The family' is no mere metaphor but a crucial technology by which modern power is produced and exercised."'\* As I have argued elsewhere, in order to colonize peoples whose societies are nor based on social hierarchy, colonizers must first naturalize hierarchy through instituting patriarchy.13 In turn, patriarchy rests on a gender binary system in which only two genders exist, one dominating the other. Consequently, Charles Colson is correct when he says that the colonial world order depends on heteronormativity. Just as the patriarchs rule the family, the elites of the nation-state rule their citizens. Any liberation struggle that does not challenge heteronormativity cannot substantially challenge colonialism or white supremacy. Rather, as Cathy Cohen contends, such struggles will maintain colonialism based on a politics of secondary marginalization where the most elite class of these groups will further their aspirations on the backs of those most marginalized within the community. Through this process of secondary marginalization, the national or racial justice struggle takes on either implicitly or explicitly a nation-state model as the end point of its struggle-a model of governance in which the elites govern the rest through violence and domination, as well as exclude those who are not members of "the nation." Thus, national liberation politics become less vulnerable to being coopted by the Right when we base them on a model of liberation that fundamentally challenges right-wing conceptions of nation. We need a model based on community relationships and on mutual respect.

#### 3rd - High Theory – the 1AC is a perspective from nowhere- there’s no solvency for their method because it’s inaccessible and provides no means of applying their framework as a response to the daily reality of violence facing intersectionally targeted populations – this performatively recenters whiteness – they disconnect their theory from application in everyday life – the truth is we don’t have the time to simply wait for oppression to deconstruct itself – we don’t have the privilege of waiting while our communities are actively incarcerated, tortured, and murdered and the sheer weight of this reality means you should reject their privileged scholarship on face

Yancy 8 (George, Prof of Philosophy at Duquesne University, *Black bodies, white gazes : the continuing significance of race*, p. 229)

The white student's objection raised the issue of how white interlocutors, when in discussions involving race and racism, may (more than they realize) deploy theory as a way of not being forced to examine aspects of their own white subject position. Indeed, the deployment of theory can function as a form of bad faith. **Whiteness**, after all, **is a master of concealment**; it is insidiously embedded within responses, reactions, good intentions, postural gestures, denials, and structural and material orders. Etymologically, the word "insidious" (insidiae) means to ambush-a powerful metaphor, as it brings to mind images and scenarios of being snared and trapped unexpectedly. Whiteness as a form of ambushing is not an anomaly. The operations of whiteness are by no means completely transparent. This is partly what it means to say that whiteness is insidious. The moment a white person claims to have arrived, he/she often undergoes a surprise attack, a form of attack that points to how whiteness ensnares even as one strives to fight against racism. Shannon Sullivan states, "Rather than rest assured that she is effectively fighting white privilege, when engaging in resistance **a person needs to continually be questioning the effects of her activism on both self and world**.,,3 Although there are many white antiracists who do fight and will continue to fight against the operations of white power, and while it is true that the regulatory power of whiteness will invariably attempt to undermine such efforts, it is important that white antiracists realize how much is at stake. While antiracist whites take time to get their shit together, a luxury that is a species of privilege, Black bodies and bodies of color continue to suffer, their bodies cry out for the political and existential urgency for the immediate undoing of the oppressive operations of whiteness. Here, the very notion of the temporal gets racialized. My point here is that even as whites take the time to theorize the complexity of whiteness, revealing its various modes of resistance to radical transformation, Black bodies continue to endure tremendous pain and suffering. Doing theory in the service of undoing whiteness comes with its own snares and seductions, its own comfort zones, and reinscription of distances. Whites who deploy theory in the service of fighting against white racism must caution against the seduction of white narcissism, the recentering of whiteness, even if it is the object of critical reflection, and, hence, the process of sequestration from the real world of weeping, suffering, and traumatized Black bodies impacted by the operations of white power. As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of institutional interpellation and **habituated racist reflexes**, tomorrow, a Black body will be murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet. The sheer weight of this reality mocks the patience of theory.

#### 4th – THEIR FAITH in the Public sphere – The 1ac believes that we can just put their affirmative out in the PUBLIC in order to prevent structural violence against Pakistani people The public sphere is not neutral. Drones policy is shrouded in secrecy – debate is impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, focus should be on the production of knowledge behind policy.

Toth 13, [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

#### 5th – Their faith in the GOVERNMENT – The 1AC chooses to footnote their own agency and call on the USFG to take action. This is the same logic that caused fascism to rise to power and it is the same logic that maintains militarism because we simple “follow orders” or “norms” about what debate and public dialogue should look like. Their presentation and political practice is one that forecloses any larger discussion of ethics and political agency that will recreate totalitarian violence.

Fasching and DeChant 01, (Darrell and Dell, Prof. of Religious Studies @ University of South Florida, Prof. of Religious Studies @ USF, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, Pg.  42-43)

Interpreting our own historical situation is a risky business, for we are still too close to the events. We do not have the distance needed to put everything into proper perspective. Nevertheless, without such an interpretation it is impossible to identify the ethical challenges that face us, so we must risk it. In this chapter we argue that two major trends unfolded in the twentieth century that are of significance for thinking about ethics: (1) the phenomenon of mass killing encouraged by sacred narratives that authorize "killing in order to heal," as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and (2) a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of non-violent resistance or civil disobedience symbolized by figures like Gandhi and King – one that functions as an ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger. The second, we suggest, offers an ethic of the holy in response to the sacred morality of the first. The modern period, which began with a utopian hope that science and technology would create an age of peace, prosperity, and progress,ended in an apocalyptic nightmare of mass death, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, leaving us with the task of creating a post/modern ethic that can transcend the techno-bureaucratic tribalism that expressed itself in two world wars. Technobureaucratic tribalism occurs when sacred narratives are combined with the technical capacity to produce mass death. While we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation of the modern propensity for mass death, we do suggest two key elements: (1) the use of sacred narratives that define killing as a form of healing, and (2) theundermining of ethical consciousness by techno-bureaucratic organization through a psychological process of doubling (separating one's personal and professional identities),which enables individuals to deny that they are responsible for some of their actions. Through sacred stories, the stranger is defined as less than human and therefore beyond the pale of ethical obligation, as well as a threat to sacred order. At the same time, bureaucracies encourage one to engage in a total surrender of self in unquestioning obedience to higher (sacred) authority(whether God, religious leaders, or political leaders), so that when one acts as a professional self on behalf of an institution (the state, the military, the church, etc.) one can say, "It is not I that acts: a higher authority is acting through me, so I am not personally responsible." Yet, despite the seemingly overwhelming dominance of techno- bureaucratic tribalism and mass killing in the twentieth century, a modest but important counter-trend also emerged – a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger, linked to such names as Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the ethical challenge of modernity as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The purpose of the remainder of this book is to examine the potential of the ethical response to that challenge offered by the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, symbolized by Gandhi and King, for a cross-cultural and interreligious post/modern ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation.

#### Our alternative is a process of Intralocality is the process of being self-critical within an intersectional framework – the 1AC reinscibes distancing as a means of protecting one’s privilege – it’s a sequencing question – we must evaluate ourselves in relation to our social locations in the debate community as a starting-point for effective debate to occur

Moore 11 (Darnell L., writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy. Darnell's essays, social commentary, poetry, and interviews have appeared in various national and international media venues, including the Feminist Wire, Ebony magazine, and The Huffington Post, "On Location: The “I” in the Intersection," http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular ask the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement¶ Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989.¶ Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual [genealogy](http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/) from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.”¶ My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us.¶ Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions?¶ What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible.¶ Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)?¶ Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

## 2NC

### Links

#### No US anti-war movement can ever succeed unless we FOREGROUND and FUNDAMENTALLY grapple with the foundations of anti-blackness and anti-indigeneity – the negative is a PRE-REQUISITE before addressing any of the affirmative problems

Ford 12 (Glen, THE US EMPIRE’S ACHILLES HEEL: ITS BARBARIC RACISM, published by Black Agenda Report, March 17, 2012)

The American atrocities in Afghanistan roll on like a drumbeat from hell. With every affront to the human and national dignity of the Afghan people, the corporate media feign shock and quickly conclude that a few bad apples are responsible for U.S. crimes, that it’s all a mistake and misunderstanding, rather than the logical result of a larger crime: America’s attempt to dominate the world by force. But even so, with the highest paid and best trained military in the world – a force equipped with the weapons and communications gear to exercise the highest standards of control known to any military in history – one would think that commanders could keep their troops from making videos of urinating on dead men, or burning holy books, or letting loose homicidal maniacs on helpless villagers.¶ These three latest atrocities have brought the U.S. occupation the point of crisis – hopefully, a terminal one. But the whole war has been one atrocity after another, from the very beginning, when the high-tech superpower demonstrated the uncanny ability to track down and incinerate whole Afghan wedding parties – not just once, but repeatedly. Quite clearly, to the Americans, these people have never been more than ants on the ground, to be exterminated at will.¶ The Afghans, including those on the U.S. payroll, repeatedly use the word “disrespect” to describe American behavior. But honest people back here in the belly of the beast know that the more accurate term is racism. The United States cannot help but be a serial abuser of the rights of the people it occupies, especially those who are thought of as non-white, because it is a thoroughly racist nation. A superpower military allows them to act out this characteristic with impunity.¶ American racism allows its citizens to imagine that they are doing the people of Pakistan a favor, by sending drones to deal death without warning from the skies. The U.S. calls Pakistan an ally, when polls consistently show that its people harbor more hatred and fear of the U.S. than any other people in the world. The Pakistanis know the U.S. long propped up their military dictators, and then threatened to blow the country to Kingdom Come after 9/ll, if the U.S. military wasn’t given free rein. They know they are viewed collectively as less than human by the powers in Washington – and, if they don’t call it racism, we should, because we know our fellow Americans very well.¶ The U.S. lost any hope of leaving a residual military force in Iraq when it showed the utterly racist disrespect of Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison, the savage leveling of Fallujah, the massacres in Haditha and so many other places well known to Iraqis, if not the American public, and the slaughter of 17 civilians stuck at a traffic circle in Nisour Square, Baghdad. What people would agree to allow such armed savages to remain in their country if given a choice?¶ The United States was conceived as an empire built on the labor of Blacks and the land of dead natives, an ever-expanding sphere of exploitation and plunder – energized by an abiding and general racism that is, itself, the main obstacle to establishing a lasting American anti-war movement. But, despite the peace movement’s weaknesses, the people of a world under siege by the Americans will in due time kick them out – because to live under barbarian racists is not a human option.

#### Shift impact –a The entirety of US imperialism is founded on elasticity. That means even if htye can solve for drones, indefinite detention and spec ops are still part of the US arsenal. The impact is militarism. Turns the case and means perm cant solve because structural violence in the middle east becomes normalized – need to critique the entire structure, which means understanding how the “I” functions in politics

Trombly, 12 – Caerus Analytics, LLC National Security/International Affairs analyst

[Daniel, "Drones are a symptom, not a cause," 5-23-12, slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/drones-are-a-symptom-not-a-cause/, accessed 9-2-13, mss]

Drones have yet to be used in a situation where a pilot of a manned strike platform would have been at serious risk from something besides a plane crash. In practice, in these kinds of campaigns the most vulnerable people are those operating on the ground to support drone operations, and more of them, not fewer of them, are brought in to support so-called drone wars. But does the lack of accident threat increase bellicosity? Not really, since again, in virtually all theaters of drone use, drone strikes occur where manned strikes or manned ISR support is also occurring. These aircraft are also at accident risk, yet they are often used alongside drones or to fulfill missions that drones also carry out. While again, on paper, drones remove these risk, in practice the kind of missions policymakers employ drones with does not suggest drones have significantly changed their calculus towards waging standoff strike campaigns. Policymakers are relying on drones The United States is only “relying” on drones in Pakistan, and even then, in Pakistan it’s also operating Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams on the ground and other proxy militia forces, and very likely receiving the kind of manned ISR support that drones very frequently do in Afghanistan (along with strike support in that theater, of course). The “unique capabilities” of drones do not change the calculus to actually initiate military action, they just change the relative logistical load of the operation. That’s not a revolution and that’s hardly enough evidence to suggest it significantly effects U.S. bellicosity or the accountability of warmaking by giving policymakers a cost free option for prosecuting strikes. In Yemen and Somalia, policymakers almost certainly are not relying on drones. The first drone strikes in Somalia did not occur until years after the U.S. had begun using JSOC ground forces, helicopters, gunships, and naval aircraft and ship fires to target the ICU and later al Shabaab. Even then, drones have yet to actually take over the duties of strike missions, as the F-15E squadron in Djibouti suggests. In Yemen, the strikes have generally been a mix of platforms that has ranged from drones, to seaborne fire missions, to manned aircraft. So it’s certainly not an undisputed fact that policymakers are relying on drones, even if this factor is publicly played up by the media and government alike. If anything, drones are over-emphasized to hide the very many people operating on the ground and in manned supporting strike and ISR platforms that are involved in these wars. It’s absolutely false to suggest that it’s casualty aversion or drone expendability which enables these conflicts, or otherwise policymakers would not be using manned missions in Yemen and Somalia (and they would probably be more willing to conduct high-value strikes when Pakistan clamps down on strikes). Farley suggests that policymakers are not casualty tolerant of air wars. This is false. In fact, the utter air superiority of U.S. forces has been invoked for the ease of conducting U.S. airpower interventions in the Balkans and Iraq after 1991. There’s significant evidence to suggest that policymakers consider aerial and naval assets writ large, along with deniable and covert SOF assets, more expendable than regular ground troops from the Army and the USMC. The record of U.S. military interventions suggests this. Casualty aversion from ground troops did not prevent the growth of an airpower mystique among policymakers which allowed for interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq between 1991-2003, and later, Libya. The punitive use of aerial and standoff fires is extended to virtually all aerial assets, and in many cases policymakers are more eager to send manned aircraft against enemy air defenses than they are to send unmanned strike aircraft into contested areas. If Farley was arguing, as many other commentators have, that there is a general airpower mystique, that would be a much more plausible argument. But the conduct of U.S. military interventions since 1991 suggests that policymakers are not very worried about pilot casualties (even after the shoot-down of an F-16 in Bosnia and an F-117 in the Kosovo War), and drone strikes rarely occur when there’s a real threat of pilot casualties beyond the accidents that can afflict the manned strike and ISR assets used alongside them. Drones make policymakers more prone to use force This is highly unlikely. As I have noted, in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, drone use has been dependent on both militarily and diplomatically permissive environments, and they are generally used alongside [non-drone]manned assets, proxy forces, special operations, and security force assistance to other states. In other words, there are a variety of militarized options which are employed concomitantly which all suggest drone strikes were not the limiting factor in the U.S. choosing to find a variety of direct and indirect methods for covertly and overtly killing foes determined to be hostile to the country. Secondly, the fact that the U.S. also uses the Pursuit Teams and other covert actors in Pakistan suggests that the U.S. would still be trying to kill its enemies across the borders if drones were not available. In Yemen there isn’t convincing evidence that drones are the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its policy there, as the increase in strikes starting in 2009 came with an increase in [non-drone]manned and naval strikes. In Somalia, drones are definitively not the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its counterterrorism policy there, as U.S. strikes in support of the American-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 were all of a manned variety. Thirdly, there’s little suggestion that drones are blinding policymakers to the virtues of riskier means of force, an example of which that Farley cites is SOF. But SOCOM has expanded enormously alongside the growth of the drone program, and SOCOM and JSOC are operating on the ground in far far more countries than we use drones! Not only that, but JSOC, CIA SAD operators, and proxy forces such as contractors, militia groups and foreign military forces are all in play in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. Standoff strikes are always and everywhere just one prong of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy – even the kinetic aspects. If anything, the biggest advantage to policymakers of drones, in terms of initiating and continuing use of force, is that they allow policymakers to obscure and misinform the public and the international community – and each other – as to the extent of the military and covert campaign. But that’s not drones eluding accountability and enabling bellicosity, it’s secrecy and the management of public perceptions. The CIA had methods of doing this thing before today’s remotely-operated weapons were invented. Back in the day, when you wanted to avoid the bad publicity of USAF or USN platforms getting formally involved in “shadow wars” (and they often were anyway, as they very obviously are now), you started a secret air force. Former USAF or USN airframes, crewed and often even supported by foreign nationals or deniable covert operators. This was what happened in Cuba and the Congo. Drones make very little difference in the ability of policymakers to militarize U.S. foreign policy approaches. They are insufficient for action in military impermissive airspace, and they are almost always used alongside manned assets, and they are always used alongside covert ground or proxy forces. This is why I greatly admire the work of national security journalists (the first coming to mind being Jeremy Scahill and Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady) who sketch out not simply the new hotness that is killer robots, but the full spectrum of direct and indirect methods that are by necessity and by preference used along side drone attacks, such as SOF, manned platforms, naval assets, spies, mercenaries, unsavory foreign security services, militias, warlords, and even terrorists previously targeted by the U.S. to attack America’s real and imagined enemies in places like Yemen and Somalia. Criticism that exalts the mythical capabilities of drones to conduct cost-free, casualty-free campaigns in fact enables to prosecution of unaccountable wars. Why? Because it’s not having the option of drones which make the policymakers responsible for determining the mission and demanding warheads put to foreheads decide to do so. If it was, then we’d see being drones used in the expendable, cost-free ways that our comprehensive strike campaigns and covert wars suggest is not occurring. Instead, the exaltation of these game-changing features of drones, which will be eagerly swallowed by the broader public, if not by critics of the war on terror, is often parroted by the fears of drone critics, which give policymakers the ability to obscure the extent of the “drone wars” and what is really going on. It’s not drones that decrease accountability or increase bellicosity. It’s secrecy and bureaucratic politics. Drones don’t truly offer any advantages in terms of secrecy or bureaucratic politics that did not already exist or are not being cultivated alongside drones by other branches of the military and intelligence community. Even the much-vaunted ability that drones give the CIA to conduct military-grade “secret wars” was pioneered aerially by the “instant air forces” of the Cold War that it set up, as well as other proxy assets with which the CIA can emply and is now employing in its modern shadow conflicts. The very same compartmentalization and secrecy that protect the drone campaign also protects the activities of [non-drone]manned strike missions, SOCOM, CIA assets, and U.S.-backed proxy forces. Drones only marginally alter the kind of impunity that U.S. air superiority gave American policymakers to launch its airpower interventions of the 1990s and 2000s (themselves, as Carl Schmitt foresaw in the 1950s, an outgrowth of naval technology). What’s at least slightly novel about these campaigns is the way in which bureaucracies and secrecy have been utilized to obscure policymakers use of all manner of overt and covert strike, ground, intelligence and proxy assets from proxy criticism, even though even this was essentially cultivated during the Cold War. Perhaps some day in the future drone capabilities will improve enough that they will actually encourage the lack of accountability and bellicosity that critics blame for them. But the record of drone usage so far suggests that the evasions of accountability and enablings of bellicosity in question are equally available to [non-drone]manned assets, standoff naval assets, and deniable covert assets. Drones have yet to be responsible for a single militarization of a U.S. CT campaign that would not have been militarized by the concomitant use of other assets. They’re a symptom of the post-Iraq decision to conduct comprehensive shadow conflicts against AQAM ( arguably pioneered in the Horn of Africa long before strike drones showed up), not from what we can observe in the conduct of drones so far, a cause of its direction. They are a useful instrument in the toolbox. But it’s the toolbox, not any one tool in it, that’s shaping policy. Giving the drones the kind of hype they receive from critics and proponents alike shifts debate obscures what’s really allowing policymakers to conduct today’s wars.

[Matt note: gender-modified]

## 1NR

### Perm and alt

#### Even if the plan is enacted it results in a far worse condition for the People of Pakistan – the plan would give a victory to the OPPRESSIVE Pakistani officials who aim to enact violence against its people on a much grander scale than happens with drone use

Ballock 13 ([Four issues Pakistanis can influence more than US drones](http://www.dawn.com/news/1076129/four-issues-pakistanis-can-influence-more-than-us-drones), [HINA BALOCH](http://www.dawn.com/authors/2118/hina-baloch) and [ZMARAK YOUSEFZAI](http://www.dawn.com/authors/2325/zmarak-yousefzai), http://www.dawn.com/news/1076129/four-issues-pakistanis-can-influence-more-than-us-drones)

US drone strikes have caused an outrage in Pakistan where thousands of young impressionable Pakistanis have taken to the streets. Until last week, the demonstrators had disrupted Nato supplies travelling through Pakistan’s northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to register their protest.¶ With political gains and expediencies involved, Pakistan’s foremost politicians have publicly canvassed the drone strikes as a violation of national sovereignty and honour. Public opinion has been diverted from the more organic and distressing issue of internal human rights abuses against Pakistan’s ethnic and religious minorities to the populist and emotional one of drone strikes.¶ While civilian casualties, as a result of these external strikes, are a reality, it is important for the people of Pakistan to also protest and denounce abuses that are a result of internal Pakistani policies and are well within the control of the state. However, political manipulation and lack of national awareness and public empathy have so far ensured that these abuses continue unchecked.¶ The masses of Pakistan are ideally placed to influence and pressure the government into stopping these human rights abuses against the country’s ethnic and religious minorities. Raising their voices against the four major issues highlighted below will safeguard their national unity, security and welfare.¶ 1) The fundamental rights of tribal Pashtuns¶ The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) usually see the front page of Pakistani newspapers when Pakistanis are angry about US drones. But little do most Pakistanis know that Fata is home to over three million Pashtuns, deprived of legal and political rights and faced with enormous economic problems.¶ Fata is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) – a 19th-century law that the British devised as an instrument of subjugation and to establish the writ of the colonial authority.¶ Despite some changes made to the law in 2011 on a piece of paper, FCR in practice continues, over a hundred years later, to deny the people of Fata basic justice. The law has famously denied tribal people three basic rights — “appeal, wakeel, daleel” (the right to appeal their detention; the right to an attorney; and the right to present evidence).¶ It has been used to collectively punish families and tribes for the crimes of individuals. It has also allowed a federally appointed executive to exercise all executive as well as judicial powers, serving as the final arbiter of justice in cases, even including those where he is the accused.¶ Likewise, many of the political rights enjoyed by Pakistanis continue to be denied to those living in the tribal areas. While the tribal people have the right to vote, they do not have the right to elect their own administrative heads, known as political agents.¶ Political agents, who are widely considered corrupt, are appointed by the federal government and not accountable to the tribal people. Moreover, Fata has no provincial assembly. Federally, Fata has elected representatives in the parliament, but those representatives have no say in the administration of Fata because no act of parliament applies to Fata.¶ On top of denying these fundamental human rights to the tribal people, Pakistan has invested little to no resources in Fata. The area remains one of the poorest and least developed parts of the country. The people of Fata lag far behind much of the rest of Pakistan in infrastructure, education, healthcare and other basic services.¶ 2) The rights and lives of the Baloch¶ Hundreds of brutally tortured and mutilated bodies of young students, political activists, doctors, lawyers, and teachers turn up every few weeks in different corners of Balochistan.¶ Their eyes scooped out, genitals bearing marks of electric prods, limbs broken, parts of their bodies drilled and their faces lacerated beyond recognition. Yet, their tormentors still want them to be recognised and the whole town to witness the burial, so they very carefully leave a note with their names in the pockets of their blood drenched shirts.¶ This is the end that many young Baloch men meet in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province that provides billions in revenues to the state. There are hundreds of people still missing, allegedly picked up by intelligence agencies and the military’s Frontier Corps (FC).¶ Their families move from one city to another, knocking on the doors of the judiciary, observing hunger strikes, holding sit-ins and demonstrations outside press clubs and covering hundreds of miles on foot to register their protest. Their aim is to seek an answer from the state on one simple question: “Where are the young and bright men of our families?”¶ The reasons for their abduction, torture and murder range anywhere from demanding a fair share in the resources extracted from their land to speaking against ongoing human rights abuses.¶ According to the Human Rights Watch, there is undisputed evidence that point towards the involvement of the Frontier Corps, Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence in these murders and abductions. The helpless locals have nothing more left to say except that their "lives are now clouded in darkness. Asking for our rights is akin to a death wish.”¶ 3) Stand up against the internal support for Taliban¶ It is widely accepted by the international community that Pakistan helped create and then later supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is likewise largely undisputed that certain segments of the Pakistani security forces to this day continue to support the Afghan Taliban. Most of the Taliban today have taken refuge inside Pakistan, near the Afghan border.¶ Consequently, Pakistan’s northwest, often characterised as one of the most dangerous places on earth, has become ground zero in global 'jihad'. The militants, many of whom come from outside Pakistan, have internally displaced millions of people from their villages, killed thousands of innocent civilians and subjected tens of millions of people to daily terror. They operate with impunity in Pakistan’s territory where they destroy the homes, schools, hospitals and mosques of local Pashtuns. They also attract US drones to the tribal areas.¶ 4) Pakistanis should protect the rights and lives of religious minorities¶ Prominent Shia doctors, lawyers, clergy and scholars continue to lose their lives to targeted acts of violence on a frequent basis. Shia neighbourhoods and places of worships remain a priority target for extremist organisations functioning across Pakistan. Hundreds of Hazara Shias have been killed in bomb blasts and other targeted violence.¶ Another ostracised community, the Ahmedis, declared non-Muslims by the state’s amended constitution, live in the dark shadow of secrecy and fear. They know that their identity, if disclosed, endangers not just their lives but also restricts access to jobs, education, housing etc.¶ Similarly, unfortunate for Pakistani Christians, this September, a church bombing in Peshawar killed 85 people, including women and children. Today, hundreds of Christians are languishing in jails across Pakistan, facing charges of blasphemy.¶ Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy law, which carries a possible death penalty, for anyone accused of insulting or criticising Islam, its scriptures or its last Prophet. The law has become a convenient tool to settle personal scores against vulnerable citizens.¶ The dwindling Hindu population is not any safer. Hindu girls in Sindh are frequently abducted by extremist groups and forced to convert and marry into Muslim families. With religious intolerance and sectarian violence growing out-of-control, it is hard to figure out what is worse in this state: To be a non-Muslim or to be the wrong kind of Muslim.¶ Conclusion¶ Despite such horrific conditions faced by the Baloch, tribal Pashtuns and religious minorities, politicians have led zero protests in solidarity with their fellow citizens.¶ There is a deafening silence and even a defensive denial by some leaders on the issue of internal support for the Taliban as well as abuse of Baloch, Pashtun and religious minorities. If anything, those often loudest about US drones have led the charge to oppose efforts to improve the conditions of Pakistan’s minorities.¶ Given that Pakistani leaders largely control the fate of these ethnic and religious minorities, the people of Pakistan can have a far greater influence to help promote equality and peace for all than they do over US drones. They, therefore, must speak for the voiceless. This is a way for Pakistanis to show that they care about the lives and rights of all Pakistanis at all times, not just when US drones are involved.¶

#### **K comes first – the depersonalization of the 1AC reproduces the cold gaze of state politicians willing to kill to protect privileged lives at home – public deliberation is possible with recognition of privilege with respect to drone violence.**

Alwazir and Mir 13 (Rooj - Yemeni-American activist and Organizer with SupportYemen, Noor - Anti-Drone Campaign coordinator at CODEPINK, "To Assess U.S. Drone Policies We Must Listen to More Farea al-Muslimis," <http://muftah.org/to-assess-u-s-drone-policies-we-must-listen-to-more-farea-al-muslimis/>)

We are not here to proffer an analysis. We are not academics. We are here as a Pakistani and a Yemeni, as activists, as citizens of this country and as citizens of our homelands. We are dismayed. We are confused. But we are not hopeless.¶ On April 23, 2013, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights held a hearing on the moral, legal and constitutional issues surrounding targeted killings and the use of drones.¶ We had been waiting for this hearing for a long time. There were a handful of location and time changes. Rumors were floating around of [Rand Paul](http://muftah.org/to-assess-u-s-drone-policies-we-must-listen-to-more-farea-al-muslimis/) appearing as a witness. Human rights organizations around the globe were urging U.S. citizens to tell their senators to pose important questions about the civilian casualties of drone attacks. With these goings on, momentum among activists had spiked by the time the hearing finally arrived.¶ We were the first in line for the 4 pm hearing, amused by the cameras trained on members of the Intelligence Committee as they were hurried by their staff into a closed meeting on the Boston bombings.¶ One of our colleagues from CODEPINK stood in the receiving line, asking senators the same question as they quickly walked past him, undoubtedly avoiding the activist in pink, “What about Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki? He was just a boy? Will you ask about why they killed him with a drone strike?” Sen. James Risch (R-ID) eloquently responded with a simple “No.”¶ Hart Building, Room 216 (ironically the same room where we disrupted CIA Director John Brennan’s first public [confirmation](http://muftah.org/to-assess-u-s-drone-policies-we-must-listen-to-more-farea-al-muslimis/) hearing) was filled with journalists and activists, many sporting Amnesty International’s black shirt with white targets.¶ The testimony began with Retired Marine Corp General James Cartwright and moved down the line, with each speaker providing a more or less “pro-drone reform” spin. Rosa Brooks, a professor at Georgetown [University](http://muftah.org/to-assess-u-s-drone-policies-we-must-listen-to-more-farea-al-muslimis/) Law Center, spoke of the anachronistic nature of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) with regard to targets with tenuous links to al-Qaeda, like Somalia’s al-Shabaab. We nodded.¶ Ilya Somin, a law professor at George Mason University, smiled broadly as he explained that enemy combatants on U.S. soil could be lawfully targeted by drones. Retired Col. Martha McSally was introduced as a special guest of Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC). She claimed we were better off calling drones “remotely piloted aircrafts or RPAs.” We winced.¶ Her testimony was not dissimilar to that of the pro-drone lobbyist par excellence Michael Toscano, President and CEO of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International. Last month at a Senate Judiciary hearing, Toscano stated that drones had a negative connotation and should be referred to instead as unmanned aerial vehicles.¶ New American Foundation’s Peter Bergen spoke about calculating the dead and noted that civilian casualties were significantly reduced in 2013.¶ At long last, [Farea al-Muslimi, a friend from Yemen, took the microphone](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIb0wMfOFhw).¶ We sobbed.¶ For the first time ever, there was a public hearing on the human, yes, “human” cost of drone warfare. For the very first time, the drone debate included, among a panel of predominantly white male faces, a young, brown Yemeni man.¶ Farea spoke clearly but emotionally about how hard it was to reconcile his love for America and Americans with the devastation unleashed against his dear Yemen. He recounted his struggle with informing his community about the goodness of America – that these drone strikes, which are killing innocent people, were not representative of the American people.¶ For the first time, U.S. Senators were hearing from someone whose [job](http://muftah.org/to-assess-u-s-drone-policies-we-must-listen-to-more-farea-al-muslimis/) was not to sift through news sources to calibrate numbers of dead people, or to write lengthy legal opinions “reasoning” about murder. Nor was this person an obvious ex-military apologist for war, cowering behind podiums and office desks.¶ For the first time, senators saw that the human cost of drone warfare went far beyond dollars and triple digit death counts. It was, instead, causing a man to question his identity and morals, placing his home and his family’s life in jeopardy, and making it difficult for him to love a country that had both given him so much and taken away equal amounts.¶ We can relate to his dilemma.¶ Farea was not there to try to win the hearts and minds of the senators by giving them policy or reform suggestions. He was there to tell his story. Still, white privilege and its associated subjectivities were clearly in action.¶ “I have been to Yemen,” Lindsey Graham said to Farea. Our blood pressure rose. “Isn’t your country in turmoil?,” Graham continued. “We have some problems,” replied Al-Muslimi. Graham ended his questioning with a self-indulgent smirk, as if to say, “I rest my case.” Graham’s neo-colonial presumptions about Farea’s understanding of his own country were disgusting.¶ No, Senator, you cannot rest your case. We, as citizens of the United States and witnesses to the turmoil in this nation, do not accept your reasoning. Schools are shutting down across the country and students are staging walkouts to protest this blow to their rights to a fair and equal education. Affirmative action is somehow still a subject of nation-wide debate, as though structural inequalities are a myth.¶ We in the United States are still waging an endless, futile and racist war on drugs and extending a school to prison pipeline that is tearing apart families and disenfranchising youth.¶ Racial profiling and racism are rife. Just last week a Palestinian woman in hijab was attacked in a Boston suburb, while a Bangladeshi man was savagely beaten in the Bronx, both in “retaliation” for the Boston marathon bombings.¶ Despite the serious shootings that devastated Aurora, Colorado (and remember Columbine?), the United States is torn down the middle when it comes to gun control. Monsanto damages our food diversity and destroys our health while propping up our elected officials with one hand and stifling small farms with the other.¶ There are uprisings; there is dissent; there is police brutality. This country, in other words, is in no less turmoil than Yemen, or Pakistan, notwithstanding the condescension and insensitivity to difference that some Americans display when comparing the United States to these countries. Their bigotry precedes them – their causation is fundamentally flawed.¶ Lindsey Graham was not the only one whose self-righteous “understanding” of the political and cultural landscape of places like Pakistan and Yemen barred him from actually exploring the human cost of war.¶ Most of the Senate hearing focused on analyzing flaws in the Obama administration’s reliance on overbearing executive authority, as well as reforming the AUMF. With bated breath, we waited for the hearing to go beyond what we had hoped was only a self-obsessed, stagnant battle of egos. Sadly, it did not.¶ Questions from the senators emphasized the legal, constitutional and operational aspects of the drone program over the stories that Farea could have told. Responses to Farea’s testimony were of the “We thank you for coming such a long way,” or “We thank you for that chilling perspective” variant. Nobody apologized for bombing his village, Wessab. These Senators, who ascribed so profoundly, unwaveringly and without question to the importance of “counterterrorism” strategies, in turn, tried to reject the validity of Farea’s personal experience.¶ There are both benefits and costs to witnessing a panel of white male privilege questioning a similar panel with one brown face. That one brown face was the outlier, the subject of fascination, the other. Upon him, the Senators projected a series of embarrassingly condescending generalizations about the “untrustworthiness” of the Yemeni government. They even asked him whether “Yemenis supported AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] before the drone strikes,” to which Farea answered no (because surprisingly, people of color do not actually welcome terrorism).¶ When he was afforded the chance, Farea spoke beautifully and passionately about the danger that drones would create more enemies than friends. He was not allowed to analyze or explain his statements any further, curtailed by the committee’s focus on legal jargon and reining in executive authority.¶ We are thankful for Farea’s presence, but are distressed by how the Subcommittee treated him – a cold, removed and uninvolved treatment markedly different from the involved and lengthy conversations the senators had with the remaining witnesses. Why invite a Yemeni to speak about the human costs of drone wars and then cast a shadow of doubt and ignorance over his experience by adopting a presumptuous tone?¶ On the positive side, Farea’s testimony was the only part of the hearing that was different from what had come before and what the public wanted to hear. We appreciate that his statements prompted moral discussion and colored the panel of academics and military experts with the human impact of drone-related tragedies. We are grateful that Farea occupies a very special place as a person who looks at the United States as a second home and as a place of generosity and kindness; this sentiment lay at the center of his testimony and highlighted his complex relationship with the U.S. drone war in Yemen.¶ We must focus on these personal stories, the destroyed and mangled bodies, identified by mothers via cell phone video. We must focus on Farea’s love and respect for this country and his simultaneous dismay at its terror. We must cherish his work in challenging the usual power dynamics. We must invite a Farea to every hearing on drone strikes and allow for the voice of a person of color to be empowered and to resound with its own volition, devoid of the presumptions and blanket abstractions of our elected officials.¶ We must disempower these officials of their given privilege and attend to the power of Farea’s words so critically different from the rest. We must not presume that his country is lesser than ours, or more conflicted than ours, or in need of the sort of dialogue that is prefaced on “What I feel is good for you, must be good for you.”¶ As we left the hearing room, a young male journalist came up to us and said, “Are you with CODEPINK? Do you know that what you do is counterproductive? Your chortling and whispering during the hearing impairs my ability to listen.”¶ This is our response to him: We are Yemeni, we are Pakistani, we are Americans. We are activists and we are dissenting – be it with an article, or a louder than usual whisper, a die-in in front of a drone manufacturer, a sit-in, a voluntary arrest, or charging towards an elected representative.